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RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL

allow the court to continue the appointment if it determined counsel
was required.50
STEPHEN E. CULBRETHr

Constitutional Law-Effect of the Right to Speedy
Trial on Nolle Prosequi
In Klopfer v. North Carolina,'theUnited States Supreme Court
held that the sixth amendment guarantee of the right to speedy
trial is a basic right protected by the Constitution and is therefore
incorporated into the due process clause and made obligatory upon
the states under the fourteenth amendment.2 Implicit in the decision is the proposition that the speedy trial guarantee is to be enforced against the states according to the federal standard.3
In Klopfer, a violation of the sixth amendment was found in
the use of the North Carolina procedural device of "nolle prosequi
with leave." Its objectionable characteristic is the power given
the state solicitor to suspend indefinitely action on a case, after an
indictment has been filed, and notwithstanding defendant's timely
demand for trial.
Klopfer, a Duke University professor, was tried in March, 1964
on charges of criminal trespass resulting from his participation in
a widespread effort to desegregate stores and eating places in Chapel
Hill in January of that year.' A mistrial was declared when the
jury could not agree and the case was continued. Prior to the next
oId. It is hoped that this would reduce the number of claims for relief
and all but eliminate the frivolous ones. Counsel should advise the prisoner
of the risks inherent in filing the petition: it endangers eligibility for parole
and if successful the relief is usually limited to a new trial and the danger of
a higher sentence.
2

87 S. Ct. 988 (1967).

E.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment right
to confrontation); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment
privilege against self incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (sixth amendment right to counsel). These decisions, like the
instant case, are part of a continuing pattern which is apparently directed
towards complete imposition of at least the guarantees of the first eight
amendments upon the states by declaring them to be a part of the fourteenth
amendment. For a discussion of how, if at all, this operation should come
about, see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
"To be enforced against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment
according to the same standards that protect these personal rights against
federal encroachment." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964).
'See Pollitt, Legal Problens in Southern Desegregation: The Chapel
Hill Story, 43 N.C.L. Rxv. 689 (1965).
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session of criminal court, Klopfer was informed by the solicitor
that a nolle prosequi would be requested. Klopfer objected on the
basis that the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as construed by the United
States Supreme Court,5 had abated the trespass prosecution. The
solicitor thereupon moved for, and was granted, a further continuance. The matter came to a head on August 9, 1965, when the case
was considered in response to a motion filed by Klopfer when he
discovered that his case was not docketed for the August term. At
the hearing on that motion, the solicitor was granted a nol. pros.
with leave. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, 6 and
further appeal to the United States Supreme Court resulted in unanimous reversal.
The holding in Klopfer renders the federal speedy trial standard binding on the states but fails to explain just what that standard is. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contain a general
authorization for the courts to dismiss an indictment if there is unnecessary delay in bringing the case to trial.7 The facts and circumstances of each case are to be considered in determining whether
there has been an unconstitutional deprivation of the right to speedy
trial.8 These facts are to be viewed in light of three purposes of
the guarantee: (1) to prevent undue incarceration prior to trial;
(2) to minimize anxiety and concern attendant upon public accusation; and (3) to limit the possibility that delay will impair the ability
of the accused to defend himself.'
Decisions of the lower federal courts help to clarify the basic
speedy trial guidelines. Consideration must be given to the potential as well as the actual prejudice which may result from long
delays.' 0 Lower federal courts cite with approval many state decisions to the effect that prejudice in fact is not required to be
shown by the defendant." Additionally, the federal decisions appear
to place the basic burden of justification for delay upon the govern5
1n Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964) the Supreme
Court held that pending trespass prosecutions for acts which were declared
legal by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were abated by the act, even though
the trespass occurred prior to its passage.
' State v. Klopfer, 266 N.C. 349, 145 S.E.2d 909 (1966).
'FED. R. CRIm. P. 48(b).
'Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957).
' United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
"0United States v. McWilliams, 163 F.2d 695, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
"United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 198 (D. Md. 1955), aff'd.,
350 U.S. 857 (1955).
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ment, rather than the accused. In Hedgepeth v. United States'
there is a statement that, whereas time is only one factor to consider, it is nevertheless the most important factor, and the longer the
delay the heavier the burden on the government in arguing that the
right has not been abridged."3 Other factors to be given weight
are the diligence of the prosecution, the defense, and the court. 14
Finally, federal authorities agree that the speedy trial guarantee
may be waived, and that a presumption of waiver or acquiescence
arises when no demand for trial is made. 15
In spite of the broadness of the federal speedy trial standard,
it appears that compliance with the fourteenth amendment requirement of "fundamental fairness"'" calls for a close re-examination
of the old and respected device of nol. pros. in North Carolina.'1
In both nol. pros. and nol. pros. with leave, the permission of the
court is theoretically required before a case may be restored to the
trial docket, and in both actions the defendant loses no freedom of
movement.' 8 In nol. pros. with leave, however, the general permission of the court to reinstate the indictment is given at the time
nol. pros. with leave is granted. This leaves the date of the trial,
if there is to be one, completely in the control of the solicitor. In
view of the Supreme Court's holding in Klopfer that the right to
speedy trial affords affirmative protection against unjustified delay,
it is difficult to see how the procedure of nol. pros. with leave can
be further tolerated. The solicitor cannot justify in advance a
delay of undetermined length. In the case of simple nol. pros., the
court must grant permission at the time of reinstatement. In this
context, keeping in mind the federal standard requirement of the
present decision, the question arises as to whether or not the North
364 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
18Id.
at 687.
1 I1d.
' United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 198 (D.Md. 1955).
See also
Amnot., 57 A.L.R.2d 302, 306 (1958).
"6Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
'Nolle prosequi is not authorized by statute, but has evidently been
carried over from English common law, where its use can be traced back

to the time of Charles II. Goddard v. Smith, 87 Eng. Rep. 1008, 1009 (Q.B.
1705). For a detailed explanation of the employment of nolle prosequi in
North Carolina and a warning that the state decision in Klopfer could be
an abuse, see Note, 44 N.C.L. Rav. 1126 (1966).
" The state does not restrict travel, but one who is under indictment may
be denied a passport by the Secretary of State, and thus forbidden to leave
the country. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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Carolina courts would refuse permission to reinstate, based solely
on a failure by the solicitor to justify the delay. To date, except
for Klopfer, it appears that no speedy trial standard, federal or
state, has seriously impaired the solicitor's use of mol. pros. and
nol. pros. with leave.
The North Carolina Supreme Court is quite clear about appointing inferior courts at all levels as watchdogs to guard against abuses
of nol. pros.;19 but apparently it has not departed from the criterion
that "the discharge of the prisoner without delay is the true test of
the termination of the action so that it matters not whether it is
terminated by nol pros.

. .

and nol pros with leave."20

The fol-

lowing sentiments appear to be more in keeping with the Klopfer
decision: "The belief that all judges will take care to see that no
unfairness is allowed to take place disregards the fact that the loss
of the right to speedy trial is in itself unfair."'"
Prior to the present decision, the speedy trial standard in North
Carolina appears to have involved judicial consideration of four
factors: (1) length of the delay, (2) reason for the delay, (3)
resultant prejudice to the defendant, and (4) any waiver of the
guarantee by the defendant.2 2 In addition, it is strongly indicated
that the guarantee does not apply to persons released on bail, 8 and
that the burden rests upon the person asserting denial of a speedy
trial to show that the delay was due to willfulness or neglect on the
part of the state.24 A demand for trial is apparently also a requisite
in order to avoid waiver of the guarantee.2"
A comparison with the federal speedy trial standard outlined
above shows that too much weight is being given in North Carolina
to the freedom of the defendant as a balm to soothe the ills of delay. Likewise, the state appears not to be in line with the federal
standard as to where the basic burden lies when the issue of speedy
trial arises. The federal proposition that the delay must not be
purposeful or oppressive2 6 is not to be narrowly construed; the delay
does not have to be deliberate to violate the sixth amendment and its
"oState v. Smith, 129 N.C. 546, 40 S.E. 1 (1901); State v. Thornton,
35 N.C.
256, 258 (1852); State v. Thompson, 10 N.C. 614 (1825).
2
Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 159 N.C. 265, 267, 74 S.E. 740, 741 (1912).
21 Note, 13 OKLA. L. REV. 325, 329 (1960).
22

State v. Lowry, 263 N.C. 536, 542, 139 S.E.2d 870, 875 (1965).

23

Id. at 543, 139 S.E.2d at 876.

State v. Hollars, 266 N.C. 45, 52, 145 S.E.2d 309, 314 (1965).
at 53, 145 S.E.2d at 315.
" Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957).

24

2 1Id.
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very length may place a heavy burden of justification upon the
prosecution.
Otherwise, so long as the anxiety attendant to public accusation
is given proper weight, the factors considered by the North Carolina
courts appear adequate for the determination of whether the speedy
trial guarantee has been abridged, according to the federal standard.
The requirements of the fourteenth amendment, then, would apparently be met if judges put teeth into the device of nol. pros. by
seriously evaluating, in light of the federal standard, each request
by a solicitor to reinstate an indictment. There appears to be
no way of squaring nol. pros. with leave with the fourteenth amendment and the use of this device should be abandoned.
It can be fairly concluded that Klopfer requires only a new
attitude in employment of simple nol. pros. But difficulties may
be avoided, and time and money saved if some method of safeguarding the right to speedy trial is employed other than dismissal of
indictments by the courts upon determination that the federal standard has not been met. The precise requirements of the guarantee
are sure to remain subject to interpretation, and therefore to
litigation. It would serve the ends of efficiency as well as justice if
the state were to go beyond the bare minimum requirement as it
stands today and enact a statute which places a definite and reasonable limitation upon the state whereby an accused person must
either be brought to trial or the indictment dismissed.
Many states have such statutes. The details vary but the most
common limitations provide for dismissal if the defendant is not
brought to trial within sixty days after the filing of the indictment
or information, 7 or within the present or next succeeding term
of court,2 8 or a combination of the two."9 All of the statutes provide that they are not operative if the delay is at defendant's request
and many are not absolute in that they operate only in the event
good cause it not shown for delay past the statutory period3 0 It
is suggested that North Carolina draft a statute which provides that:
2
' ARIz. RULES CRIMI. PROC. 236 (1956); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1382 (1954);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.495 (1957); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.46.010 (1961).
"8GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1901 (1953) ; IDAHO CODE tit. 19, § 3501 (1948) ;
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (1964); N.D. REV. CODE § 29-1801
(1943); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 812 (1951); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-51-1
(1953).
" IOWA CODE § 795.2 (1962).
"0The statutes of Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada and Oklahoma
contain this provision,
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(1) defendant must be brought to trial within the same term of
court in which the indictment is filed, or within the next succeeding
term of a court competent to try him, and (2) unless good cause is
shown by the state for failure to bring defendant to trial within
this period, this statute shall operate as a bar to future prosecution
for offenses arising out of facts alleged in the indictment. This
'
proposed statute would not operate as a "sword for the defendant, 31
for the General Assembly is able to draft initially, and subsequently
revise as necessary, the time limitations to reflect the current ability
of the state's courts, acting with reasonable diligence, to bring persons to trial. That period at any given time might be longer than
two terms of court. At any rate, Klopfer makes clear that an outer
limit of some type, however determined, is necessary.
So much for the law. In reality, Klopfer has not yet had his
trial. He attempted to have the case removed to federal court under
procedures recently outlined by the United States Supreme Court for
cases arising out of civil rights disputes.82 But the federal district
court declined to take jurisdiction on November 17, 1967, stating
that the state court should be given another chance to dismiss the
indictment.
WILLIAM S. GEImER
Constitutional Law-Defamation under the First AmendmentThe Actual Malice Test and "Public Figures"
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivai' the United States Supreme
Court held that "a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open" 2 was such that in certain cases libelous misstatements
of fact were qualifiedly protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. In granting this constitutional protection to misstatements
of fact,8 the Court held that the protection was for critics of the
" State v. Lowry, 263 N.C. 536, 542, 139 S.E.2d 870, 875 (1965).
" Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966); Greenwood v. Peacock, 384
U.S. 808 (1966).
'New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2Id. at 270.
'The Court expressly adopted the minority view. 376 U.S. at 280 & 281.
See, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908); Ponder
v. Cobb, 257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E.2d 67 (1962); Annot., 150 A.L.R. 358

(1944).

